Notes on the SIGAR Afghanistan Report

Notes on the SIGAR Afghanistan Report and WikiLeaks

SIGAR Afghanistan Report:

A recently released US document, titled "Actions Needed to Improve the Reliability of Afghan Security Force Assessments" and published by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) Arnold Fields, has pointed out serious flaws in the manner in which the military evaluated the progress by the Afghan army and police. Allied trainers and mentors are supposed to bring both groups to the stage where they can hold their own against the insurgents.

The report was released on 28 June 2010 (comments on the recent WikiLeaks posts follow afterwards).

From the perspective of Otoom the focus is not so much on the bureaucratic framework under which assessments of any kind are made, but rather the mindset responsible for establishing the necessary parameters in the first place; in other words, the cognitive dynamics underlying the processes of perception.

A measuring device called Capability Milestone (CM) has been used by the US military, where CM1 denotes the highest capability (ie, ready to be handed over the responsibility to look after their own), and CM4 the lowest.

As mentioned on the pages dealing with the situation in Iraq (Notes on the Iraq Study Group Report and Notes on Where is Iraq heading? Lessons from Basra) the demographic in that area is characterised by intense religiosity, a commensurate emotionalism, closely-knit tribes and a general lack of education based on societal priorities.

Afghanistan presents a similar picture. The aim by the US and its allies to establish a comprehensive society that overarches the differences created by ideological views which have been hardened through compact social scopes and supported by lack of a general education must therefore be questioned.

The SIGAR report stresses the difficulty of establishing a common framework for evaluation, so that a certain CM mark referring to several particular units will in fact indicate comparable achievements. Apart from the procedural detail, if one unit of the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF) or the Afghanistan National Police (ANP) consists of members from certain tribal areas and another unit features a different composition, for an outsider to evaluate their respective behaviour according to some common standard would be a problem from the beginning. According to the report, "'The inability of top-rated units to sustain their capabilities over time calls into question the effectiveness of the CM rating system as a reliable measure of ANSF development progress. Furthermore, the CM rating system created unintended disincentives for ANSF units to attain top-rated capabilities. Finally, similarly rated ANSF units have not always manifested similar capabilities'" (p.5).

As far as sustaining their capabilities are concerned, "The ANP will simply stop doing what we asked them to do as soon as we leave the area. This is especially troublesome in areas of security and patrolling" (p.5). As to the reasons why, "Mentor/partner support for ANA [Afghanistan National Army] units at the top rating level has been minimized to re-prioritize support for lower-rated units; in the case of ANP units, it is withdrawn entirely. Not surprisingly, ANSF units dislike the prospect of losing U.S. and Coalition mentors and partners who bring with them force protection, expertise, supplies, funding, and prestige" (p.6).

When a group that, in line with the strategy and its feedback assessment, has been left to its own devices and then falters for lack of "protection" and "expertise" immediately afterwards then there would be a serious issue with the group's ability to digest information and training. Furthermore, when prestige becomes a factor one should consider the degree of maturity which otherwise would engender the exact opposite: someone who has been prepared and knows it would leave the protection of guardian proudly and endeavour to demonstrate that they can now stand on their own two feet. Not so here.

Demographics that function under the umbrella of a collective rule set tend to exhibit an ongoing mutual dependency on the others. The absence of a sufficient degree of individualism that allows leaving the 'nest' more familiar in the West has lead to a misinterpretation by the Coalition of what they are dealing with.

The comment, "For example, our discussions with army and police mentors and partners revealed that in some fully supplied units poor leadership, corruption, and other factors had significantly diminished operational effectiveness" (p.7) illustrates the typical effects of tribalism, and they jeopardise the goals of the US to a considerable extent.

Another section of the report is telling: "However, personnel inputs used in ANA unit capability assessments did not reflect operational realities, as they were based on measurements of the number of personnel assigned to each unit, without also considering the actual number of soldiers present for duty. Due to substantial absences without leave (AWOL) and approved absence rates, this method of evaluation has falsely inflated measures of personnel readiness, contributing to an overstatement of ANA capabilities" - and, in a footnote, "MOD's [Ministry of Defense] definition of AWOL includes those personnel absent from regular duty after 24 hours. MOD does not consider personnel late back from leave to be AWOL. Additionally, according to officials at NTM-A/CSTC-A, an MOD AWOL amnesty was in place for ANA personnel through the end of the last solar year, 1388. That amnesty allowed troops to return to the rolls without punishment " (p.8).

With soft spots like these the idea does suggest itself that the assessments were meant to appear as positive as possible, and as a consequence making it easier for the Coalition to extract itself from the quagmire.

The remarks, "However, even with a top rating for personnel, a unit may have a low number of personnel present for duty. For example, as of March 2010, the 1st kandak [battalion] of the 3rd Brigade, 205th Corps, was granted a CM1 rating for personnel, based on a fill rate of 99 percent. Specifically, this kandak had 796 personnel authorized and 795 assigned. However, the same unit had only 469 personnel present for duty, giving it a present-for-duty rate of 59 percent, which would have corresponded to a CM3 personnel rating" (p.9) can be seen as a confirmation of the above.

Another example is found in the following section: "Overstated Police Capabilities: The Case of Baghlan-e Jadid IJC's [International Security Assistance Force Joint Command] March 2010 TRAT report included a CM1 rating for the Baghlan-e Jadid police district in the northern Afghan province of Baghlan. The district first reached a CM1 rating in August 2008 and, according to IJC, maintained that rating for 9 months until it graduated from the Focused Police District Development (FPDD) program in June 2009." And, "One IJC official commented, 'Unfortunately, *FPDD+ graduation has become synonymous with CM1 (a super CM1 if you will) that doesn't exist at all in reality.' He added that in his opinion the Baghlan-e Jadid police force had 'withered away to the point that it barely functions.' Another U.S. military official, operating from within RC-North said, 'I doubt CM1. Most of their police officers do not even have uniforms, nor has the majority received basic training, either'" (p.13).

Not only do the results of their training remain elusive, the people themselves are hardly there.

"Heavy attrition in the Afghan military and police forces has undermined developmental gains in many units, by reducing the number of trained personnel available for operations. As of March 2010, the ANA's AWOL rate was 12 percent and, as of May 2010, the ANP had an overall attrition rate of over 17 percent. Those losses, coupled with high levels of approved absence and frequent reassignments, have left many units with insufficient personnel to permit effective operations. For example, according to NTM-A/CSTC-A, as of February 2010, solar-year-to-date attrition in ANCOP-'the premier force in the ANP,' according to DOD-was about 73 percent. One ANCOP battalion in RC-West had an attrition rate of 140 percent over that period. The attrition rate for Afghan Border Police over the same period was 27.4 percent, according to NTM-A/CSTC-A" (p.18).

The reason? "In one instance, in July 2009, mentors reported that at Waza Zadran police district in Paktia Province there were only 6 ANP personnel in place, compared with the tashkil authorization of 53 officers. That district completed FPDD training in April 2008, when 23 students were trained, according to NTM-A/CSTC-A's records. Mentors said this severe attrition was largely due to actions taken by powerful anti-coalition forces and disappointment over pay levels" (p.18).

It seems those "powerful anti-coalition forces" wait until the men have been instructed in the ways of the Coalition and then take them aside to make use of that information. Hardly an effective way to wage a war. Interestingly an article in Brisbane's Courier Mail reported on the increasing sophistication of the Taliban, as related by US military officials [1].

As far as corruption is concerned the report notes, "Fuel: Corruption has affected fuel availability and distribution within the ANSF, and thus the operational effectiveness of army and police units. Problems with fuel accountability, including siphoning and selling fuel, were widely reported in police unit assessments and detailed for us on our visits to army and police units around the country. An October 2009 report on a top-rated police unit in Chaparhar, Nangarhar Province, stated that the lack of accountability for fuel was the greatest issue in sending out patrols. A January 2010 report from Bala Boluk, Farah Province, described fuel-related corruption as a 'perpetual problem.'
- Illegal checkpoints: Mentor/partner reports noted that in some places it was typical for Afghan police to 'shake down' travelers for money in order to pass through districts.
- Personnel: Misuse and diversion of police personnel were cited in numerous police assessments as challenges to effective operations, weakening the present-for-duty strength of many police units.
- Pay and rank: Pay fraud and rank abuse were widely reported, although electronic fund transfer programs were credited with reducing payroll abuse in some police units. Reports of ghost police were common and RC-North police mentors stated that paying for promotion was commonly accepted among the ANP. Mentors in Ghowrmach police district, Baghdis Province, reported in October 2009 that, even though electronic fund transfer was not available for the unit due to its remote location, pay continued for absent police, those whose loyalties were suspect, and officers who had never worked in the district" (p.20).

Corruption is a by-product of compact social scopes, where the allegiance to those considered close overrides any concerns about the wider society. It therefore represents a lack of maturity.

Further confirmation of what a tribal culture means on ground level appears in the following comment regarding drug use: "As of February 2010, results from drug tests during a personnel asset inventory of the Afghan police force overall showed positive results for drug use in 17 percent of police tested. NTM-A/CSTC-A officials who assisted MOI with the inventory said that this rate was likely understated, and the March TRAT report noted that the inventory results for Ghazni and Paktika Provinces were returning an average usage rate for controlled substances of at least 50 percent, with the highest rates in more remote areas" (p.20). One example was given: "According to several officials with responsibility for ANSF development, an extreme case of drug abuse had occurred at an ANCOP unit of about 100 personnel based at Nimla Gardens, Nangarhar Province. There, according to eye witness accounts from U.S. military personnel, ANCOP personnel were openly using marijuana and were unwilling to conduct operations or even leave their compound" (p.20).

The more remote the area, the stronger the ties among the locals. That example could have come straight out of a bad movie.

When one considers that "since 2002, the United States has provided over $27 billion-over half of all reconstruction dollars-for ANSF training, equipping, and sustainment" (p.2) the need for applying a proper cognitive evaluation of the conditions on the ground presents itself in stark relief. Quite apart from the ill-considered plan to combat Islamic militancy in a far away territory without giving the problematic influence of Muslims within Western borders hardly any thought, the idea of fast-tracking evolution in people who have maintained their characteristics for many centuries reveals a political correctness which refuses to accept that not all people around the world are the same.

As this report shows once again, such blindness is being paid for with many lives and the waste of literally billions of dollars.

Reference:
1. Courier Mail, 17 Jul 10, "Taliban step up attacks".

Comments on the WikiLeaks posts:

The SIGAR audit gave many hints what the situation on the ground is like. Away from the daily sound bites propagated through the media the harsh reality comes through.

An even more direct view has been made available through the recent leaks of military reports to the WikiLeaks website. One after another they are the voices of soldiers as they field their stories day by day. The language is terse and precise.

Readers need to provide their own imagery that these sentences imply.

Here are four samples from almost 77,000, taken from the file afg.csv on the 28 July 2010. As can be seen, they more than confirm the sentiments expressed on these pages - relating the actual environment that soldiers have to put up with in a land that is far from what we are used to in the West.

As you read them, try to visualise the type of people who act in such a manner; their tribalism, their religious fervour, their small social horizon, their brutish nature. And what it must be like to face all this day after excruciating day, and for the slightest mistake put through the wringer by their own side. Then imagine that we sacrifice our soldiers' lives and many of billions of our money for that.

2920943B-A8E3-42E6-8358-2BA813832EEA:
(S//REL GCTF) MULLAH ABDULLAH, MULLAH LALA, AND OTHER UNIDENTIFIED TALIBAN ARE TARGETING ORUZGAN PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR JAN MOHAMMAD FOR ASSASSINATION. (S/REL GCTF) SOURCE COMMENT: AN UNIDENTIFIED TALIBAN RECENTLY SENT A NOTE OF WARNING AND CAUTION TO ORUZGAN PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR JAN MOHAMMED. THE UNSIGNED NOTE WAS WRITTEN IN BLUE INK ON A SCRAP OF BLUE-LINED WHITE PAPER. (S/REL GCTF) THE TRANSLATION OF THE NOTE IS AS FOLLOWS: FROM SOME UNKNOWN TALIBAN, WE GIVE THIS WARNING TO MULLAH MALIM AND MULLAH YOUSEF BECAUSE YOU GIVE PEACE AND ACCEPTANCE TO THE SONS OF BUSH. YOU HAVE SELECTED THE WAY OF UNBELIEVERS SO WE KNOW NOW WHAT TO DO WITH YOU. WE ARE JUST WAITING FOR THE RIGHT OPPORTUNITY. WE WILL NEVER FORGET THE STORY OF HAJI LALA AND THE HILUXES. (EXPLICIT) YOUR MOTHER WHEN WE ARE KILLING YOU WE WILL NOT SEE THE HOLY QURAN. YOU CAN SEE WHAT HAPPENED TO AMANULLAH. WE HAVE LEFT OUR HOMES, SONS OF THE UNBELIEVERS, YOU HAVE PUT THE HOLY QURAN UNDER YOUR FEET JAN MOHAMMAD, AND WE WILL (EXPLICIT) YOUR MOTHER. (TF LINEBACKER INTSUM 27 MAY 04)

8358BAC5-C7D9-4859-915A-CD78BA5AEF8F:
300910ZOCT07 - PCC reported about attack on Jingle truck IVO Baza Khala (VB 720 799) at 300730ZOCT07: 4 trucks were attacked (VB 75200 78200). 301020ZOCT07 PCC reported that ANP patrol was sent to the location, found 1 civilian truck burned. Several trucks from the convoy arrived at jingle truck holding yard at FOB Sharana. The drivers were questioned by THT and intelligence officer of PBG. One of them, named Aziz Rahman, was the driver of the lead truck. He said he was stopped by the attackers IVO Baz Kala village, about 2 km after he past the second Police station IVO the Band-e Sardeh dam. Four attackers came out from the village, wearing green military-style jackets, black sneakers, and had their faces covered. They all had beards. They were armed with AKs and tried to direct his truck into the village. The driver took advantage of their carelessness and escaped by his truck. The attackers shot at the truck to stop him, but he kept going and managed to escape with only minor damage to his vehicle and cargo. The rest of the trucks also tried to escape. But some of them were stopped and burned. The driver doesnt know how many were stopped and burned but he is sure he saw a smoke. He also added that he saw ANP arriving at the scene. Police forced attackers to escape. Second driver named Sameulah said that he also escaped from the scene by his truck. He said that he saw about 7 attackers wearing military jackets. They were armed with AKs. PKM, RPGs. They tried to stop the convoy by shooting. Analysts Comments: It seems that villagers of Baz Kala are involved in the attack. The question is if they were coerced or willingly cooperated with the attackers. The attackers seem to be the criminals who attacked the convoy to seize goods, taking advantage of unarmed drivers and unsecured convoys. PBG Patrol including THT will go to Baz Kala with ANP to investigate and determine the villagers opinion and knowledge about event. A search of the houses may be possible if locals wont cooperate with ANP and PBG.

DD59CF66-B26F-B600-6581994F0A5D48AB:
While completing an IED Recovery Operation, IVO 42S XC 44131 7700, CIED JAF was notified of an IED along Route Orlando, Kot District, Nangarhar Province, IVO 42S XC 47449 79199. CIED JAF was notified by CSE JAF, that WRA had contacted them and stated that they had come across an IED while leaving the previous IED scene, IVO 42S XC 44131 77000. WRA stated that there was a crowd of children around the scene who had departed when they arrived. The children had pulled up the wires and wrote "Bomb" on several rocks around the IED. WRA located the wires protruding from the ground and proceeded to uncover the IED. CIED JAF arrived on scene and conducted IED operations. Due to WRA procedures, 741/4 donned bomb suit and semi-remotely removed the main charge from its emplacement. The main charge consisted of a TC-6 anti-tank landmine with 2x 82mm mortars tied together with det cord. The mortar fuze wells were filled with soap. This is a TTP of an IED builder in the Kot/Bati Kot area who actively built IEDs until he was entered into the HIIDE system in JAN09. No power source or means of initiation were recovered. 741/4 believes that the LN children had taken the items for the batteries. All evidence was collected and turned over to CEXC JAF.

0BDD418F-B4E7-C4A3-E0FADB8160049001:
1PPCLI BG was conducting an independent patrol. FF reported an IED STRIKE from a small detonation. FF conducting a search for a possible secondary device. FF performed 5-25s and will pull back. No injuries reported, but blown third tire on left side of VEH. UPDATE 191009Z FF have located a secondary device at GR 41R QQ 46834 87030 in a Wadi at a crossing site. No INS activity ATT. EOD will exploit at a later time. Vehicle has been self-recovered. UPD2 191603Z FF DETAINED 2 X INS TRYING TO GET EYES ON A POSSIBLE RCIED DURING THE IED STRIKE, C/S BELIEVE THEY WERE TRYING TO DETONATE A DEVICE WHILE INTEL REPORTS WERE BEING REPORTED TO C/S OF SIMILAR ACTIVITIES. DETAINEE #2 (NNOR AHMED) WAS SEEN TALKING TO HIS CELL PHONE WHILE PUSHING A BUTTON ON THE PHONE FURIOUSLY, HE WAS OBVIOUSLY FRUSTRATED, THEY WERE BOTH TALKING TO THEIR CELL PHONES. FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE SCREENING THEIR STORIES CONTINUALLY CHANGED. AT FIRST DETAINEE # 1 (MUSAN JAN) CLAIMED TO KNOW DETAINEE # 2 WHILE DETAINEE #2 SAID HE DID NOT KNOW DETAINEE #1. THAT STORY CHANGED NUMEROUS TIMES. DETAINEE #1 CLAIMED HE WAS FARMING TOBACCO WHILE DETAINEE #2 SAID HE WAS FARMING WHEAT. BOTH THE DETAINEES TESTED POSITIVE WITH EXSPRAY. DETAINEE #2 HAD A VERY HIGH CONCENTRATION AND THE TEST TURNED OUT COMPLETELY PINK. THE DETAINEES WERE CARRYING 1 X RADIO, 2 X CELL PHONES, AND 1 X GARAGE DOOR OPENER. THEY WERE BOTH ESTIMATED TO BE 22 YEARS OLD, AND ARE IN GOOD CONDITION. BDA: 1 x VEH damage. **EVENT CLOSED**

After nine years of those conditions and no end in sight it is justified to ask what the real purpose of the exercise is supposed to be.

Is it to protect some idealised version of Islam from its own especially demonised self; or is it to play evolution in fat-forward mode on a people who obviously haven't read the script; or is it nothing more than the acting-out of a dreamy vision held by a bunch of naked emperors who miss no opportunity to parade themselves before the masses?

PS: A Pentagon assessment - obtained by the media only recently - concluded that the announced damage to US soldiers in Afghanistan by the above leaked material did not materialise after all. It seemed all along that the type of information gleaned from those reports was nothing that people over there would not have known already. If there is any damage it concerns the reputation of the decision makers back home who sent the troops there in the first place.

18 Jul 2010